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Abstract
Several experimental studies show that ex post communication mitigates opportunistic be-
havior in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, is
nonetheless still obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for two channels by
which ex post communication may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. One is
related to strategic signaling. The other involves emotions induced by others' expressed disap-
proval. The presence of ex post communication strongly fosters pro-social behavior. The data
do not support the signaling hypothesis, favouring the emotion-based explanation instead.
Keywords: Public goods game, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, Ex post communication.
JEL Classification: C72, D83.
1 Introduction
A growing body of experimental studies finds that institutions may promote norms of pro-social
behavior in economic contexts where individual rationality conflicts with social interest. These
institutions are predominantly based on two mechanisms: ex ante communication and ex post
monetary punishment.1 This paper is devoted to an institution that has been only recently
brought to economists' attention as a means of inducing efficiency in social dilemmas: ex post
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1Masclet, Noussair, and Villeval (forthcoming) provide an extensive literature review.
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communication. Although empirical results are encouraging, the root underlying the effect of
this institution, especially in a repeated interaction, is still obscure. This study provides a novel
testbed for the two mechanisms by which ex post communication may potentially affect behavior
in a repeated social dilemma: one is related to signaling, the other one stems from agents' utility
function incorporating not only the monetary gains generated by decisions, but also other agents'
perception (i.e. approval or disapproval) of these decisions.
In a seminal contribution, Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) use a repeated public
goods game, based on the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM in short). After each round,
every subject observes his group members' contributions, sends a message containing disapproval
points to each group member, and is informed about the sum of points received from others.
Masclet et al. conjecture that ex post communication in a repeated interaction may affect subjects'
behavior in two ways. First, it may serve as an information transmission device prior to the
next round  for instance, signals may convey a warning that the sender will decrease his future
contribution unless the receiver increases his. Second, being aware of others' opinions may affect
emotions  for instance, people may display an aversion to being disapproved/a preference for
being approved, and act less opportunistically so as to avoid/deserve it (Holländer, 1990).2 They
argue that these two effects may be separated by contrasting subjects' behavior under partner
and stranger matching. Intuitively, in the former setting the effect of ex post communication may
stem from both strategic information transmission and disapproval-aversion, while in the latter
behavioral effects may only be a matter of subjects' aversion to disapproval. In their experiment,
partner matching yields significantly higher contributions than stranger matching, which supports
the information transmission hypothesis. In a related study, Peeters and Vorsatz (forthcoming)
use a similar experimental game and introduce treatments in which every subject may transmit
an emoticon (a frowny in one conditions, a smiley in the other) to each partner, and then is
informed about the number of emoticons he received. Comparing patterns of behavior under
partner matching (where a moderate treatment effect is observed) and stranger matching (where
there is virtually no treatment effect), the paper concludes that ex post messages are unlikely to
involve emotions, but rather facilitate the exchange of information before an upcoming round.
On the other hand, some experimental studies suggest that the behavioral effect of ex post
communication may be driven by an emotional response to others' expressed disapproval. López-
Pérez and Vorsatz (2010) report that the availability of fixed-form, post-play messages containing
judgments of other participants' decisions makes subjects more cooperative in a one-shot prisoner's
dilemma game. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) and Xiao and Houser (2009) identify the same
2Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) refer to ex post communication as non-monetary sanctioning,
provided that in a companion treatment attributed points are transformed into monetary punishment. Similar
nomenclature (like informal sanctions or non-monetary punishment) is also used in other papers discussed in this
section. Since the goal here is to test whether this institution is actually used to inform or to sanction people, I
consistently use a more neutral term  ex post communication.
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effect on altruism in subjects playing a dictator game when a free-form, post-play communication
is possible. Czap, Czap, Khachaturyan, Burbach, and Lynne (2011) implement a two-stage game
in which a common-pool resource is used by a group of subjects, out of which some have private
incentives to produce publicly undesirable externalities. They find that the reception of a negative
emotional feedback (via frownies) after the first stage reduces externalities in the second stage,
while providing positive feedback (via smilies) does the opposite. Dugar (2010) studies a repeated
weakest-link coordination game and finds that the introduction of disapproval points helps groups
of players converge towards the Pareto-superior Nash equilibrium, while approval points bring no
improvement in this respect, inhibiting a fast convergence to the Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium.
Dugar (2013) finds that the availability of disapproval points generates higher contributions than
approval points in a fixed-group VCM game based on Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval
(2003), and that combining both kinds of points brings a further improvement with this respect.
Dugar attributes the effects observed in these two experiments to an asymmetrical sensitivity to
approval and disapproval.
Thus, the literature lacks a clear-cut consensus on the source of the behavioral effect of ex post
communication in repeated social dilemmas. More importantly, the state-of-the-art methodology
consisting of a direct comparison of the outcomes observed under partner and stranger matching
may be misleading in separating the two potential channels by which ex post communication
may affect behavior in a repeated interaction. An extensive survey by Andreoni and Croson
(2008) not only reveals that both matching schemes are very likely to affect subjects' behavior in
repeated public goods games, but also that the relationship between both protocols is ambiguous
 in some experiments partner matching provides higher contributions, while other studies report
the opposite. Hence, a simple comparison of outcomes from both protocols is susceptible to the
confusion of the effect of communication and the simultaneous variation in behavior due to the
applied matching method.
Herein, I propose a novel methodology for testing the hypotheses put forward by Masclet,
Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003). Experimental design builds on Masclet et al.'s sound intu-
ition that under both partner and stranger matching ex post communication may affect subjects'
emotions, but only the former also allows for strategic signaling. At the same time, the experi-
mental methodology neutralizes the unwanted and uncontrollable effects of the matching protocol
on subjects' behavior. The presence of ex post communication is found to strongly foster pro-
social behavior. Furthermore, the data do not support the signaling hypothesis, favouring the
emotion-based explanation.
2 Empirical strategy
The experimental methodology introduced by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) and
subsequently used by Peeters and Vorsatz (forthcoming) has its strenghts and weaknesses for
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separating the signaling dimension and the emotional dimension of ex post communication in a
repeated interaction. Its advantage is that it identifies environments where both of these phenom-
ena either can or cannot co-exist. The main disadvantage is that these environments may affect
behavior simultaneously to the content of messages, and that these behavioral effects are highly
unpredictable.
As a simple illustration of the above problem, consider a situation where only two factors affect
contributions: ex post communication and matching protocol. Since both effects arise simulate-
nously, future contributions are affected not only by past communication, but also  unobservedly
 by the matching protocol. The two effects should not be considered as orthogonal: assuming
that the content of communication is correlated with own and others' past behavior (which is the
case in most studies of ex post communication, including this one), future messages depend on
past contributions, so that the very nature of communication is also (indirectly) influenced by the
matching protocol. Consequently, the presence of a hidden matching protocol effect in a repeated
game aggravates the isolation of the actual relationship between communication and contributions.
Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) provide a way to control for the matching protocol
effects with a difference-in-difference approach: in every session subjects play a sequence of rounds
without communication, which is followed by an analogous sequence with communication, and
then another sequence without communication, holding the matching protocol constant. They
argue that since subjects' behavior is similar in the initial sequence under both matching schemes,
thus the differences observed in the second stage are unlikely to stem from the matching protocol
effects. However, it should be also noticed that a conclusive comparison in the second stage is
only possible in the absence of a systematic partner-stranger difference in the first stage, and a
scenario where observations are neutral to matching protocol effects is far from being a regularity
in lab experiments on public goods games.3 Peeters and Vorsatz (forthcoming) use a classical
between-subject design and observe systematic matching protocol effects: in each round of every
treatment, partner matching induces higher contributions than stranger matching (see the working
paper version of their study, Peeters and Vorsatz (2009)). The most general solution to this issue
is an experimental protocol where actions are uncorrelated with the matching scheme.
Thus, the central methodological challenge is to create an experimental environment that allows
for different features of ex post communication, at the same time ruling out the unobserved effect
of the matching protocol on decisions. To this end, I introduce a novel uniform matching protocol
where a random process decides whether groups are maintained or broken up. In each round of
a repeated game, subjects decide upon their level on contribution before learning whether their
group prevails until next round. This design neutralizes the uncontrolled forward-looking effects of
different matching protocols on contributions, while controlling for the backward-looking factors
3For instance, these effects are absent in only 4 out of 13 experiments overviewed by Andreoni and Croson
(2008). In 5 cases partner matching brings higher contribution that stranger matching, in the remaining 4 cases
the opposite occurs.
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(as discussed in the next section). Ex post communication, in turn, only takes place after the
fate of groups is known to subjects. Consequently, the effect of communication can be captured
in two different strategic contexts: when groups prevail from one period to another, and when
they change between rounds. In line with Masclet et al.'s original argument, strategic information
transmission is only possible in the former case, while emotional pressure may occur in both cases.
Following many previous studies, I implement a non-verbal communication. In order to assure
the interpretability of messages, the VCM game is played by groups of two subjects, so in each
round every participant learns about other group member's contribution, sends a message and
receives one in return. Consequently, messages may be easily matched to individual actions,
which creates an environment that (i) facilitates agents' comprehension of non-verbal content, and
(ii) allows the experimenter to trace the relationship between individual messages and individual
contributions.4 Moreover, it is of common knowledge that no group ever re-appears after having
been dissolved, which is aimed at ruling out the possibility of sending future-oriented signals
between subjects who are about to cease interacting.
2.1 Experimental game and conditions
Experimental game. Pairs of subjects play the following version of the VCM game. Each player
holds an initial endowment of 15 Experimental Currency Units (ECU), and may contribute any
part of it to the common pool.5 Decisions are made simultaneously and the amount accumulated
in the common pool is then multiplied by 1.5 and re-transferred to group members in equal parts.
Thus, the gain of player i who contributes Ni and interacts with player j who contributes Mj
equals:
Gaini = 15− 0.25×Ni + 0.75×Mj (1)
Although the social welfare is maximized when each player contributes his entire endowment,
the dominant strategy is to contribute nothing.6 Therefore, the standard game theory predicts
that in the unique Nash equilibrium all players contribute nothing.
Baseline condition. In the baseline condition (BC), the game is repeated as follows. In each
occurrence, subjects (i) decide upon their contribution to the common pool, (ii) learn whether
their current group survives until the next round, and finally (iii) observe the other group member's
4This two-person design, motivated by the clarity of communication, comes as a departure from the four-person
design used in the related studies by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) and Peeters and Vorsatz
(forthcoming). However, experimentals by Isaac and Walker (1988) and Isaac, Walker, and Williams (1994) suggest
that the group size does not per se affect contributions in VCM.
5In the lab implementation, contributions may only take integer values between 0 ECU and 15 ECU.
6To avoid framing effects, instructions use neutral phrasing: I use expressions such as players and group members
rather than partners, and contributions are never related to cooperation. See Rege and Telle (2004) for evidence on
framing effects in public goods experiments.
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contribution, as well as their own gain. Subjects are informed that in each round their groups
survive with a 50% chance, that this process is entirely random, and that every change is permanent
 groups that disappear cannot re-appear in the future. In all rounds following round 1, an
announcement prior to the initial stage reminds subjects whether their group has changed with
respect to the previous period. The important issue of the asymmetry of information about players'
past behavior between maintained and newly formed groups is addressed in the following way.
Before stage (i), members of newly formed pairs are informed about the contribution recently
made by their current group member in his former group.7 Although the extent of historical
information may vary between new and old pairs due to the randomness of group re-matching,
this design maintains the minimum level of knowledge about group members' past.8
Communication condition. The communication condition (CC) encompasses the three stages
forming BC, as well as the current-group-status reminder. In addition, in stage (iv) subjects are
asked to express their opinion about a group member's decision by assigning a certain number of
points (between 0 and 10) to him. Experimental instructions state that a high number of points
expresses disapproval: 10 points correspond to the strongest disapproval, while 0 points correspond
to the weakest disapproval, and that assigned points do not affect either participant's gains for the
experiment. Then, each subject is informed about the number of points he received from the other
group member. If groups change between periods t− 1 and t, prior to stage (i) subjects not only
learn about the decision taken by their current group member in t−1 (like in BC), but also about
the number of points he received.
2.2 Experimental procedures
The experiment involves a total of 12 sessions (6 for BC and 6 for CC), each comprising 8 subjects.
I use a round-robin matching protocol (ensuring that every two subjects have the opportunity to
interact during the experiment) and the random group survival rule outlined above. Consequently,
the structure of group matching and the number of rounds may differ between sessions. In order
to control for the effects of these variations, I use six independent, randomly generated matching
sequences (henceforth labeled Game 1, . . ., Game 6 ) and run two separate sessions for each of
them: one implementing BC and one implementing CC.9 Subjects are informed that the game
contains between 10 and 16 rounds and that its length is determined randomly. In practice, sessions
7Instructions (translated from French to English) are provided as a supplementary material.
8Another advantage of the present design is related to reputation-building. One may argue that this design may
involve reputation-building. However, even if subjects indeed try to establish a reputation, this incentive remains
constant throughout the entire experiment: across different kinds of pairs  newly established and preserved, as well
as under different communication conditions. Yet, this symmetry is another important refinement with respect to
the usual partner-stranger comparison in which reputation-building may unobservedly arise in the former scheme,
but not in the latter.
9The exact structure of these sequences can be found in the supplementary material.
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contain between 11 and 15 rounds, and the pairs of subjects interact for up to five consecutive
rounds.10
At the beginning of each session, participants are randomly assigned to their computers and
asked to fill in a small personal questionnaire containing basic questions about their age, gender,
education, etc. The written instructions are then read aloud. Before starting, subjects are also
asked to fill in a quiz assessing their understanding of the game they are about to play. Once the
quiz and all remaining questions are answered, the experiment begins.
Once all pairs complete a round of the game, subjects are informed that either a new round
will start, or the experiment will end. In the latter case, a single round is randomly drawn and
each participant receives the amount in EUR corresponding to his gains in that round (converted
from ECU to EUR using an exchange rate 1 ECU = 0.40 EUR), plus a show-up fee equal to 5
EUR.
All sessions took place in the lab of the University of Paris 1 (LEEP) in July 2012. The re-
cruitment of subjects was carried out via LEEP database among individuals who have successfully
completed the registration process on laboratory's website.11 Among 96 participants, 51 are male
and 45 are female. 63 participant are students, of which 67% might have some background in game
theory due to their field of study.12 82 subjects had taken part in experiments organized in LEEP
in the past. Participants' average age is roughly 25. No subject participated in more than one
experimental session. Each session lasted about 45 minutes with average earning of 12.20 Euros.
3 Results
3.1 Individual and group behavior
Table 1 presents subjects' average contributions as a function of the structure of the experimental
game and the communication condition. In five experimental games out of six, the presence of
ex post communication increases the average contribution. This shift in behavior is significant
at the 5% level according to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.13, 14 Interestingly, the behavior of
inexperienced players is neutral to the treatment variable: a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum
test using individual observations from round 1 does not reject the hypothesis that subjects'
10In the remainder of the paper, I use the terms pair and group interchangeably.
11The recruitment uses Orsee Greiner (2004); the experiment is computerized through a software developed
under Regate Zeiliger (2000).
12Disciplines such as economics, engineering, management, political science, psychology, mathematics applied in
social science, mathematics, computer science, sociology, biology.
13For each of the six games, this test matches averge contributions observed in BC and in CC, and therefore
accounts for the effects related to different game structures.
14All p-values used in statistical analysis correspond to two-sided tests.
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Table 1: Average contributions by treatment and experimental game
Conditions Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 Game 5 Game 6 Average p
Average contributions in round 1
Baseline 7.625 6.750 8.125 6.375 5.750 3.875 6.417 0.210
Evaluation 6.250 8.250 6.500 8.375 7.875 8.750 7.667
Overall average contributions
Baseline 5.000 2.900 4.420 3.083 6.010 2.846 3.942 0.046
Evaluation 4.083 7.783 6.045 6.325 9.135 8.029 6.938
Session details
Number of subjects 8 8 8 8 8 8
Number of rounds 12 15 11 15 12 13
Note. Columns 1-6 present average contributions in each experimental game, using data from round 1 (upper part) and all
rounds (middle part). The last two columns summarize these results and provide non-parametric tests for the significance of
the effect of treatment on contributions: the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test using individual observations in round
1, and Wilcoxon signed-rank test using game-level matched averages for the aggregate data. The lower part of the table
contains additional information on the number of subjects and the length of each experimental game.
Figure 1: Distribution of contributions across treatments
Note. For each experimental treatment, data contain 624 observations
from 6 experimental sessions. Contributions are given in ECU.
behavior is the same in both experimental environments (p=0.210).15
15This may suggest that the effect of communication via disapproval points involves learning of conventions and
arises via procedural experience. An identical phenomenon is observed by Dugar (2010, 2013).
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Figure 2: Contributions, ex post communication and re-matching
Note. For each combination of experimental condition (BC or CC) and
pair status (re-matching occurs before period t or not), data contain 288
observations from 6 experimental sessions. Contributions are given in ECU.
Result 1. The average contribution in the communication condition is significantly higher than
in the baseline condition.
To further investigate the behavioral transition caused by communication, Figure 1 compares
the distributions of contributed amounts in both experimental conditions. In BC, over 40% (251
out of 624) of decisions are zero contribution, as compared with less than 25% (148/624) in CC.
Moreover, contributions between 1 ECU and 4 ECU are more frequent in the former than in the
latter. The relationship between the two conditions becomes unstable until the threshold level
of 10 ECU, above which all values appear substantially more often in CC than in BC, including
the case in which the entire endowment is tranferred to the common pool (105 times in CC
against 63 times in BT). In addition, Figure 2 suggests that this phenomenon is robust to the way
pairs are matched prior to interacting. Within each experimental condition, one observes similar
distributions of contributions in newly formed and retained pairs. On the other hand, the key
difference between both conditions observed in Figure 1 prevails: under ex post communication
the frequency of low contributions is substantially lower than without communication, while the
opposite holds for high contributions.16
Formal statistical tests of the signaling and emotion-based hypotheses are provided via para-
16For instance, zero contributions are observed 134 times in BC in the absence of prior re-matching of pairs, and
110 times had re-matching occurred. Analogous figures in CC are 80 and 65. Moving to the opposite extreme,
contributions of 15 occur 31, 26, 54 and 42 times in the four respective cases.
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Table 2: Determinants of group behavior
Model 1 Model 2
Dep. variable: cit + c
j
t |cit − cjt |
Intercept (β0) 8.032 4.422*
1Re−matchingtt−1 (β1) 0.753 0.928*
1CC (β2) 6.375* 0.838
1CC × 1Re−matchingtt−1 (β3) -0.188 -0.785
Additional controls:
Round dummies (Round 3, . . ., Round 15 )
Matching sequence dummies (Game 2, . . ., Game 6 )
N 576
R2 0.208 0.043
Note. OLS regressions using group-level observations. Dependent variable in Model 1 is the sum of contributions of players
i and j forming a group at time t (cit + c
j
t ), whereas Model 2 uses the absolute difference of contributions within this group
(|cit − cjt |). Columns contain model's coefficients (β) and corresponding p-values, with */**/*** indicating significance at
the 10%/5%/1% level. Explanatory variables include a dummy indicating the occurrence of group re-matching prior to
(1Re−matchingtt−1 ) and another dummy indicating whether the game involves ex post communication (1CC), as well as their
interactions. Models also control for round and matching-sequence effects, with Round 2 and Game 1 as reference points
omitted in regressions. Data cover observation from round 2 onwards. Standard errors are clustered at the session level (12
clusters) and are corrected using the leave-one-out jackknife procedure.
metric regression models. The core instruments for this analysis are embedded in the 2× 2 design
of the experiment: the first dimension being the presence of random 1Re−matchingtt−1 (set to 1 if
re-matching occurs, 0 otherwise) of pairs prior to round t, while the second  the presence of ex post
communication treatment (1CC = 1 for communication condition, 0 otherwise). The statistical
analysis focuses on two dependent variables:
Contributions gathered by players i and j interacting at time t (cit+c
j
t). The signaling role of ex post
communication may be confirmed by the significance of 1CC in maintained pairs, and a significant
difference between the contributions accumulated in maintained and re-matched pairs when 1CC =
1  both of which indicate that the effect of ex post communication on group productivity depends
on the continuity of interaction. In addition, the significance of 1CC among newly created pairs
would suggest that the presence of ex post communication also affects behavior when interactions
are not continuous, which points to the importance of the emotion-based hypothesis. Finally, this
explanation becomes dominant in the absence of a significant difference between contributions in
maintained and re-matched pairs when 1CC = 1. These mechanisms are tested in Model 1.
The absolute difference between the contributions of players i and j who form a pair at time t
(|cit − cjt |). Model 2 provides a complementary test for the signaling hypothesis. If ex post com-
munication operates as an efficient signaling mechanism, then it should facilitate players' mutual
strategic adaptation resulting in more equilibrated contributions within pairs. Consequently, the
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Table 3: Contributions and historical information in newly formed pairs
Intercept (θ0) 4.133*** 7.200*** 4.304**
Group member' s:
Contributiont−1 (θ1) 0.228***  0.291**
Received_pointst−1 (θ2)  -0.080 0.158
N 288
R2 0.053 0.003 0.060
Note. OLS regressions of player's contribution in t on the historical information about the current group member: his
contribution in t− 1 and the number of points he received in t− 1. Columns contain model's coefficients (θ), with */**/***
indicating significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Data come from newly matched pairs. Standard errors are estimated using
observations clustered at the session level (6 clusters in total), and then corrected using delete-one jackknife.
contributions in maintained groups playing under the communication condition should involve less
intra-group inequality than elsewhere.
Table 2 summarizes the estimates from both models.17 Model 1 reveals that the presence of
communication increases the provision of public good in both retained and re-matched groups
(H0 : β2 = 0, p = 0.058, H0 : β2 + β3 = 0, p = 0.023, respecively). Moreover, the group
behavior in the communication condition does not depend on the previous occurence of re-matching
(H0 : β1 + β3 = 0, p = 0.497). Altogether, this evidence favours the emotion-based explanation
over the signaling hypothesis: the impact of communication on the group behavior is significant,
but does not depend on players' ability to transmit strategic signals.
Model 2 provides evidence in the same vein: the within-group inequality in maintained pairs
does not differ systematically between BC and CC. One cannot reject the joint hypothesis that the
level of inequality in maintained pairs is not affected by the presence of ex post communication,
and that the level of inequality in the communication condition does not depend on the nature of
groups' re-matching (H0 : β2 = 0 ∩ β1 + β3 = 0, p = 0.464). On the other hand, the contributions
within newly formed groups in the baseline condition tend to be more divergent than in retained
groups (H0 : β1 = 0, p = 0.099), which suggests that the experience acquired over the course of
a continuous interaction improves players' capacity of strategic adaptation, and that this effect is
superseded by the ex post exchange of messages.
Result 2. The effect of communication on group productivity and players' strategic adaptation
within groups is not related to the availability of future-oriented signals.
17Supplementary material contains a more detailed data analysis. First, it presents the estimates of additional
controls included in the models from Table 2 but not reported there. Second, it provides an additional specification
 double-censored tobit  as an alternative to the OLS estimates reported in Tables 2-4. Both methods yield similar
outcomes.
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Figure 3: Sent disapproval points and the relative size of contribution
Note. Data come from 6 sessions and contain 288 observations for each
type of group. Contributions are given in ECU.
3.2 Does re-matching preclude strategic signaling? A test of the altruistic
signaling hypothesis
Note, the underlying assumption of the above analysis is that the transmission of strategic signals is
only possible in continuous interactions. However, since players in newly established pairs observe
the degree of disapproval their group members received in their old pairs, one may also consider an
alternative scenario  altruistic signaling  where disapproval points are utilized to label players
who enter into a new interaction.18 More precisely, subsequent members of each subject's pair
may transmit cues about this person to their successors and adapt their decisions according to the
cues transmitted by their predecessors.
To test this hypothesis, the data from newly matched pairs are used to regress the individual
contributions on the historical information held by each player about his current group member:
his past contribution and the number of disapproval points he received in the previous period. The
estimates are presented in Table 3. This simple empirical test suggests that re-matching precludes
the strategic use of these points: while group members' past behavior matters for subjects' choices,
disapproval points the former received in their previous groups do not.
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3.3 Formation of ex post messages
This section addresses two central questions related to the formation of ex post messages: (i)
what is the relationship between ex post messages and underlying contributions, and (ii) does this
relationship vary between retained and re-matched groups? The answer to the first question is
provided by Figure 3 which presents the average number of points sent by subject to his group
member as a function of his deviation from other group member's contribution, and the outcome
of the random draw that determines group's future. Under both matching scenarios, the overall
pattern seems rather coherent: the number of sent disapproval points grows as the difference
between sender's and receiver's contributions grows.
Answering the second question requires a more formal insight into the process of message forma-
tion. For this sake, I estimate a linear model representing the number of points received by a player
in round t as a function of his Group_member′s_contributiont, as well as its relative size within
his group  i.e. the magnitude of Sender′s_positive_deviationt or Sender′s_absolute_negative_deviationt
with respect to other group member's decision. The effect of prospective re-matching is captured
by the variable 1Re−matchingt+1t (like before, set to 1 if re-matching is about to occur between t
and t+ 1, a 0 otherwise) as well as its interactions with the above variables.
In the absence of re-matching prior to the upcoming interaction, players send more disapproval
points the less their group members contribute (H0 : γ1 = 0, p = 0.002), and the more they
contribute themselves relative to their group members (H0 : γ2 = 0, p = 0.010). The magnitude of
own negative deviation (in absolute terms), in turn, does not play a significant role in the process
of point attribution (H0 : γ3 = 0, p = 0.329). Importantly, these effects do not change due to
re-matching. One may not reject the joint hypothesis that the prospect of group re-matching does
not change the relationship between one's relative contribution and the number of disapproval
points he sends (H0 : γ5 = 0 ∩ γ6 = 0 ∩ γ7 = 0, p = 0.356).
Result 3. Ex post disapproval points are assigned in an informative and coherent manner: low
contributors receive more disapproval points than high contributors. This pattern of point attri-
bution does not vary significantly between pairs that are about to cease and continue interacting.
4 Summary and discussion
Recent developments in economic research suggest that communication may mitigate selfishness
in social dilemmas, and the source of this phenomenon is often explained as an emotional reaction
communication evokes in humans. For instance, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) and Vanberg
(2008) argue that ex ante communication may reduce the scope of opportunistic behavior due
to agents' aversion to lying, while Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) relate this transition to guilt
aversion due to which agents experience disutility from letting down others' expectations.
18I thank Martin Leroch and Marc Willinger for pointing this out.
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Table 4: Sent disapproval points and the relative size of contribution
Intercept (γ0) 6.227***
Group_member′s_contributiont (γ1) -0.380***
Sender′s_positive_deviationt (γ2) 0.167***
Sender′s_absolute_negative_deviationt (γ3) 0.075
1
Re−matchingt+1t
(γ4) -0.536
1
Re−matchingt+1t
×Group_members′s_contributiont (γ5) 0.047
1
Re−matchingt+1t
× Sender′s_positive_deviationt (γ6) 0.010
1
Re−matchingt+1t
× Sender′s_absolute_negative_deviationt (γ7) -0.138
N 576
R2 0.361
Note. OLS regressions of the number of points sent in t on variables indicating the level of Group_member′s_contributiont,
the value of Sender′s_positive_deviationt or Sender′s_absolute_negative_deviationt, a dummy indicating the occurence
of 1
Re−matchingt+1t
as well as its interactions with the three above variables. */**/*** indicate coefficients' (γ) significance
at the 10%/5%/1% level. Standard errors are estimated using observations clustered at the session level (6 clusters in total),
and then corrected using delete-one jackknife.
The present study provides new evidence on the effect of communication in social dilemmas,
and further investigates the link between communication and emotions. First, echoing the previous
findings by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) and Dugar (2013), the paper reports that
the availability of ex post communication involving costless evaluation points substantially reduces
opportunistic behavior in a repeated VCM game. Second, it offers a new angle for understanding
this important behavioral process. The experimental design aims at evaluating two potential
(and non-excludable) factors behind the behavioral effect of ex post communication: first, the
preference for approval/aversion to disapproval, understood as emotional (i.e. non-monetary)
utility or disutility drawn from others' opinions about own behavior; second, the transmission of
strategic signals (such as threats) linked to future interactions. It builds on the intuition that under
both a repeated interaction within fixed groups of players (partner protocol) and interactions with
constantly changing groups (stranger protocol) ex post communication may affect emotions, but
only the former also allows for future-oriented strategic signaling. While retaining these different
features of communication, this new design neutralizes the uncontrollable effects of matching
protocols on contributions.
The experimental literature lacks unequivocal evidence on the root underlying the behavioral
effect of ex post communication in repeated social dilemmas. For instance, Masclet, Noussair,
Tucker, and Villeval (2003) suggest that both of these mechanisms may influence subjects' be-
havior, Peeters and Vorsatz (forthcoming) highlight the role of strategic information transmission,
while Dugar (2013) points towards the importance of the emotions induced by others' judgments
about own actions. Data from this experiment do not support the signaling hypothesis, favouring
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the emotion-based explanation instead. First, the provision of public good is invariant across
groups that may exchange future-oriented messages and those whose messages cannot be future-
oriented. Although communication increases the production of public good irrespectively of the
continuity of group's interaction, it does not improve players' strategic adaptation (measured as
the within-group inequality of contributions), even if interactions extend throughout multiple peri-
ods. Second, the relationship between one's relative contribution and the resulting level of others'
disapproval is coherent (low contributors face stronger disapproval than high contributors) and
does not vary as a function of the continuity of interaction.
In a broader perspective, this experimental evidence may also contribute to furthering our
understanding of the determinants of the emotional response to communication. Charness and
Dufwenberg (2010) discuss two implementations of pre-play, cheap-talk, natural language commu-
nication in a trust game: an unstructured (free-form) protocol where (almost) any content may be
transmitted between players, and a fixed-form protocol which only allows for single-phrase, stan-
dardized "bare" promises. Their conclusion is that only unrestricted communication may induce
emotional reaction from subjects (which, in their study, is explained as an emotional cost caused
by lying-aversion). This conjecture finds support in some experiments contrasting non-verbal and
verbal ex ante communication. Wilson and Sell (1997) find no effect of numertical pre-play com-
munication in an experimental VCM game. Using similar setup, Bochet, Page, and Putterman
(2006) again observe no effect of numerical pre-play announcements, while verbal pre-play commu-
nication is found to foster cooperativeness. Finally, Ben-Ner, Putterman, and Ren (2011) find that
both mechanisms improve the efficiency of subjects' behavior in a trust game, with verbal commu-
nication systematically outperforming numerical communication. Ex post communication based
on natural language was also found to affect subjects' emotions in social dilemmas (Ellingsen and
Johannesson, 2008; Xiao and Houser, 2009; López-Pérez and Vorsatz, 2010). On the other hand,
Dugar (2010, 2013) suggests that non-verbal ex post communication may also refer to emotions.
An important result pinned down by the present experiment differs at face value from Charness
and Dufwenberg's insight, echoing Dugar's conjecture. Even a structured, artificial and wordless
method of expressing own judgment  such as the utilization of evaluation points  creates an
environment in which emotions (inducted by the aversion to others' disapproval) may refrain op-
portunistic behavior in social dilemmas. A more systematic comparison of verbal and non-verbal
peer-feedback mechanisms could certainly constitute a desirable avenue for future research.
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Supplementary material
Written instructions
Author's note: BC (EC) at the beginning of a paragraph indicates that this part is specific to baseline
condition (evaluation condition)
You are about to take part in an experiment in which you can earn money. Your gains will depend on
your decisions, as well as on the decisions made by other participants.
Before starting, we would like to ask you to answer a few standard questions (concerning your age,
education, profession, . . . ) that will help us to get to know you better. This information, as well as the
amount of your gains in this experiment, will remain strictly confidential and anonymous.
Please, fill in the questionnaire using the interface on your computer screen, which is divided into three
parts:
• In the top section, you will find information that might help you in making decisions.
• In the middle section, you will submit your decisions by clicking on a relevant button.
• In the bottom section, you will see all your decisions and gains from previous rounds of the experiment.
Thank you.
The experiment
The experiment consists of several rounds. The total number of rounds is random and might vary
between 10 and 16. In each round, participants are divided into groups of two. In each round (more
precisely, in Stage 2 described below) a random draw decides that:
• either your group will not change in the next round;
• or that your group will change in the next round. In order to form your new group, another
participant will be chosen at random among participant who have never been part of your group
before.
Both events are equally probable  each occurs with a 50% chance.
In every round, each participant's gain is determined as follows. At the beginning of round, every
person possesses the initial endowment of 15 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit).
Members of each group may create a common pool. Each participant freely chooses his level of contri-
bution to the pool that may range between 0 ECU and 15 ECU. The total amount gathered in the pool is
then multiplied by 1.5 and divided equally among group members.
For instance, if you are participant i who contributed Ni, and the other member of your group, par-
ticipant j, contributed Mj , then your gain (Gaini) equals:
Gaini = 15− 0.25×Ni + 0.75×Mj (2)
The Table provided below presents your gain in ECU in a given period as a function of your level of
contribution and the other group member's level of contribution.
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What happens in each round
At the beginning of each round (accept for the first one), the result of the random draw that took place in
the previous period is recalled to each participant. Each participant is informed that:
• either his group remains the same as in the previous round;
• BC: or in the ongoing round he will play with a different person. In this case, each participant is
also informed about the level of contribution of his current group member in the previous period.
• EC: or in the ongoing round he will play with a different person. In this case, each participant is
also informed about the level of contribution of his current group member and the number of points
he received in the previous period.
Every round contains 3 stages:
Stage 1. Each participant chooses his level of contribution to the pool.
Stage 2. Each participant observes the outcomes of a random draw that determines his group in the next
round.
Stage 3. BC: Finally, every participant is informed about his group member's level of contribution and his
own gain for the round.
EC:
• At the beginning of this stage, every participant is informed about his group member's level of
contribution and his own gain for the round.
• Then, each participant has to possibility to express his opinion about the other group member
by assigning him a certain number of points. A high number of points expresses dis-
approval: 10 points correspond to the strongest disapproval, 0 points correspond
to the weakest disapproval. To do this, you should select the number of points on your
screen and press OK button to confirm your choice. The choice of the number of points has
no impact on either participants' gains in the experiment.
• Finally, every participant is informed about the number that were assigned to him
by the other group member.
At the end of each round, a message on your screen will inform you that either a new round is about
to start, or that the experiment ends.
Payment of your earnings
At the end of the experiment, one round is selected at random. Each participant receives a sum
in EUR corresponding to the amount he earned in this round, converted from ECU to EUR using an
exchange rate 1 ECU = 0.40 EUR, plus a bonus of 5 e for completing the experiment. All payments are
made individually and in cash.
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For obvious reasons, you are not allowed to talk during the experiment. Participants who
violate this rule will be excluded from the experiment and all payments. It is crucial that you understand
perfectly the rules of this experiment. Should you have any questions to ask, please raise your hand.
Thank you for your participation!
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Evolution of contributions in experimental games
Figures 4a-f suggest that treatment effect is stable over time: in Games 2, 5, and 6 contributions in
communication condition dominate those in baseline condition in all rounds; in Games 3 and 4 this tendency
is reversed in only 3 rounds out of 11, and 1 round out of 15, respectively. Solely in Game 1 the relationship
is more ambiguous.
Figure 4: Evolution of average contribution by game and treatment
(a) Game 1 (b) Game 2
(c) Game 3 (d) Game 4
(e) Game 5 (f) Game 6
Note. Vertical lines indicate rounds after which groups are being re-matched. Solid
line indicates baseline condition, dashed line indicates communication condition.
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Robustness check: OLS vs. double-censored tobit regressions
This section provides a comparison of different specifications (OLS vs. doubled-censored tobit) of regression
models presented in Tables 2-4. For each model, the columns contain the coefficients from an OLS regres-
sion, as well as the coefficiants and average marginal effects (ME) from a double-censored tobit regression.
*/**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Altogether, this evidence suggests that
both estimation methods yield very similar results.
Table 6: Determinants of group behavior: extension of Table 2
Model 1 Model 2
Dep. variable: cit + c
j
t |cit − cjt |
βOLS βTobit METobit βOLS βTobit METobit
Intercept (β0) 8.032 6.741  4.422* 3.534 
1Re−matchingtt−1 (β1) 0.753 1.996* 1.365* 0.928* 1.659* 1.184**
1CC (β2) 6.375* 7.652* 6.177** 0.838 1.229 0.877
1CC × 1Re−matchingtt−1 (β3) -0.186 -1.013 -0.816 -0.785 -1.311 -0.935
Additional controls:
Round
3 -1.627 -2.211* -1.873** 1.580 1.979 1.467
4 -0.938 -1.208 -1.029 0.938 0.911 0.659
5 -2.803** -3.171** -2.670** 0.551 0.537 0.385
6 -2.241** -2.740** -2.313* 0.551 0.708 0.510
7 -2.960** -3.517** -2.952*** 0.080 0.061 0.043
8 -3.860** -4.883** -4.050*** -0.839 -1.359 -0.916
9 -3.741*** -4.788*** -3.975*** 0.592 0.469 0.335
10 -5.205*** -6.339*** -5.175*** -0.976 -1.614 -1.077
11 -4.553** -5.694** -4.683*** 0.488 0.434 0.310
12 -4.317*** -5.594*** -4.606*** 0.704 0.602 0.433
13 -4.587** -5.693** -4.683*** 0.687 0.508 0.364
14 -3.550** -5.123** -4.241*** 1.666 1.326 0.969
15 -4.334** -5.829** -4.787*** 0.630 0.501 0.359
Game :
2 2.067 2.569 2.019 -0.616 -0.688 -0.504
3 1.228 1.624 1.258 -1.408 -1.603 -1.146
4 0.719 1.421 1.098 -1.268 -1.139 -0.825
5 6.636 8.013 6.633 -0.386 -0.328 -0.242
6 2.249 2.789 2.198 -1.263 -1.265 -0.913
N 576
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Table 7: Contributions and historical information in newly formed pairs: extension of Table 3
Determinants: θOLS θTobit METobit θOLS θTobit METobit θOLS θTobit METobit
Intercept (θ0) 4.133*** 2.320**  7.200*** 6.976***  4.304** 2.932 
Group member's:
Contributiont−1 (θ1) 0.228*** 0.344*** 0.201***    0.291** 0.408* 0.260**
Received_pointst−1 (θ2)    -0.080 -0.140 -0.089 0.158 0.193 0.123
N 288
Table 8: Sent disapproval points and the relative size of contribution: extension of Table 4
Determinants: γOLS γTobit METobit
Intercept (γ0) 6.227*** 7.831*** 
Group_member′s_contributiont (γ1) -0.380*** -0.766*** -0.433***
Sender′s_positive_deviationt (γ2) 0.167*** 0.314*** 0.182***
Sender′s_absolute_negative_deviationt (γ3) 0.075 0.128 0.074
1
Re−matchingt+1t
(γ4) -0.536 -1.113 -0.644
1
Re−matchingt+1t
×Group_members′s_contributiont (γ5) 0.047 0.066 0.038
1
Re−matchingt+1t
× Sender′s_positive_deviationt (γ6) 0.010 0.048 0.028
1
Re−matchingt+1t
× Sender′s_absolute_negative_deviationt (γ7) -0.138 -0.220 -0.127
N 576
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